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Abstract
This note proposes the continuous treatment approach as a valuable alternative to propensity
score matching for evaluating economic effects of merger and acquisitions (M&As). This
framework allows to consider the variation in treatment intensities explicitly, and it does
not call for an arbitrary definition of cut-off values in traded ownership shares in order to
construct a binary treatment indicator. We demonstrate the usefulness of this approach
using data from European M&As and by relying on the example of post-M&A employment
effects. The empirical exercise reveals some heterogeneities over the whole distribution of
acquired ownership shares and across different types of M&As and country groups.
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1 Introduction
Empirical research on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) is inconclusive with regard to the eco-
nomic effects of firm takeovers.1 This note provides one possible explanation for this observation,
pointing to the more or less arbitrary definition of cutoff-values in traded ownership shares that
is typically used in empirical applications. Focusing exclusively on such cutoffs (commonly used
ones are 25 or 50 percent), one might ignore that the extent to which new owners are able to
influence a firm’s strategic decisions varies over a wide range of ownership levels.
One important aspect that affects a new owner’s ability to impose strategic changes within the
newly acquired entity concerns corporate governance regulations. In theoretical terms, corpo-
rate governance constitutes a set of regulations and constraints that aim to address problems
arising from the separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means 1932, Williamson 1985).
Separated ownership and control paired with asymmetric information is likely to result in non-
zero agency costs due to the incentives for opportunistic behavior (e.g., Jensen and Meckling
1976).
In the context of M&As, corporate governance regulations shape both the pre- and post-
acquisition behavior of acquirung firms (see, e.g., Gugler and Yurtoglu 2008). With regard
to the latter, new (majority) owners are, for example, limited in their strategic decision making
as minority owners’ interests might be protected by corporate governance regulations. To give
just two examples: Ownership of 75 percent plus one vote assures to overcome blocking minori-
ties (typically at 25 percent) in many European countries. At the other end of the ownership
distribution, it might be mentioned that European corporate laws typically allow shareholders
with (at least) five percent ownership to call for an extraordinary general meeting. The reported
regulations commonly intend to strengthen the position of minority shareholders limiting the
leeway of majority owners. With regard to potential restructuring measures that a new majority
owner would like to impose after a successful M&A, corporate governance regulations might,
1With regard to e.g., the employment effects of M&As and among others, Conyon, Girma, Thompson and
Wright (2001, 2002), Girma and Go¨rg (2004), Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004), Lehto and Bo¨ckerman (2008) and
Siegel and Simons (2010) estimate significantly negative or insignificant effects, while McGuckin and Nguyen
(2001), Bandick and Go¨rg (2010), Stiebale and Trax (2011) and Oberhofer (2013) provide evidence in the opposite
direction.
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therefore, be viewed as an explicit constraint for doing so. In this regard, the share of acquired
ownership (inversely) measures the constraints a new owner is facing when imposing strategic
changes.
From an econometric perspective, defining a discrete treatment variable from continuous own-
ership information reduces data variation and, in turn, might induce inaccurate estimates of
M&A effects. Alternatively, one might rely on a continuous treatment approach based on gener-
alized propensity score matching (GPSM) (see Imbens 2000, Hirano and Imbens 2004). GPSM
is widely applied in various fields of economics,2 but not for M&A evaluation. Given that the
strategic impact of a new shareholder on a firm’s decisions is varying over the acquired owner-
ship share, it seems particularly attractive for M&A evaluation for (at least) three compelling
reasons: First, it allows to estimate heterogeneous effects of M&As over the whole ownership
distribution. Second, one might aggregate M&A effects over any arbitrary subset of the dis-
tribution of traded shares. Finally, GPSM represents a straightforward generalization of the
commonly applied propensity score matching (PSM) and is, therefore, easily available to the
applied researcher.
One important strategic decision typically involved in a process of restructuring concerns the
changes in employment after a M&A took place. In what follows, we thus rely on the example
of post-M&A employment effects in Europe to illustrate the economic importance of explicitly
accounting for variation in the treatment intensity as measured by acquired ownership shares.
The main results of this exercise can be summarized as follows: In the full sample, employ-
ment effects are positive and statistically significant for all levels of acquired ownership above
25 percent. This effect tends to increase slightly up to the 50 percent threshold and remains
relatively constant afterwards. For full take-overs involving 100 percent of ownership the posi-
tive employment effect seems to be lower. Unfortunately, given the relatively small number of
included M&A cases we are not able to estimate the effects very precisely. Accordingly, from
our application one may infer that the binary M&A indicators used in the previous literature
2For instance, GPSM is applied to evaluate returns to schooling (see, e.g., Behrman, Cheng and Todd 2004),
unemployment programmes (e.g., Lalive, Van Ours and Zweimu¨ller 2007) and instruments of regional policies
(e.g., Becker, Egger and von Ehrlich 2012).
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are able to capture the main patterns of M&A induced employment effects. However, when
focusing on specific sub-samples, it turns out that for domestic M&As, for example, significant
employment effects are only observable above 75 percent of acquired ownership. In a similar
vein, we estimate significant positive employment effects for cross-border M&As above the 25
percent ownership threshold, although the commonly applied definition of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) assumes a 10 percent ownership as the relevant threshold (see e.g., World Bank
2015). Given our initial evidence, a 25 percent threshold definition would maybe more accu-
rately describe strategic control in cross-border M&A activities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as following: In the next section we briefly summarize
the continuous treatment approach and discuss its applicability to M&A evaluation. Section 3
presents our sample and provides the estimation results. In Section 4 we offer some concluding
remarks and discuss some potentially promising avenues for further research.
2 A continuous treatment approach for M&A evaluation
In the program literature, it is of particular interest to evaluate the economic consequences of a
specific program, such as job-training or school vouchers. Based on a counterfactual framework
developed in the seminal contribution of Rubin (1974), several scholars have proposed alterna-
tive econometric (statistical) approaches for the identification of causal program effects. Among
these methods is the so-called PSM approach pioneered by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). For
discrete treatment information (i.e., the observational unit received a treatment or not), this
approach proposes to estimate a model for the probability to receive treatment with the result-
ing model prediction, known as the propensity score. Further, PSM assumes that, given this
propensity score, selection into the treatment is unconfounded. In other words, the treatment
is independent from the potential outcomes with or without treatment. Accordingly, condition-
ing on the propensity score is sufficient to accurately estimate the causal treatment effect. For
practical purposes, PSM methods typically involve the comparison of outcomes of a treated unit
with an untreated control unit with the most similar propensity score. GPSM, as proposed by
Imbens (2000) and Hirano and Imbens (2004) extends this reasoning to treatment information
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that is measured in a continuous fashion.
In M&A evaluation, the treatment is typically based on the relative ownership shares involved
in transactions. By definition, this measure can be continuously distributed within the [0,1]
interval. In contrast to PSM which is based on a (arbitrarily defined) binary M&A indicator,
GPSM explicitly takes advantage of the variation in treatment intensities (see Imbens and
Wooldridge 2009, for an overview). Accordingly, this approach allows to estimate the impact of
M&As on acquired firms at any level of acquired ownership shares.
GPSM is implemented in three steps (see, e.g., Fryges and Wagner 2008, Appendix I): In the
first step, one has to estimate the conditional distribution of the treatment variable given a set
of observable characteristics, which in our case reads as
E(Di|Xi) = Λ(Xiβ), (1)
where Xi denotes a vector of covariates observed for each firm i. Di is the treatment intensity,
measured as the traded ownership shares ranging from zero to one. β represents the parameter
vector to be estimated, and Λ(·) is the cdf of the logistic distribution (see Papke and Wooldridge
1996) which guarantees that 0 < λ(Xiβ) < 1 for all Xiβ ∈ R. The conditional distribution of
the treatment given the covariates thus is given by exp(Xiβ)1+exp(Xiβ) . For fractional response data,
that are bounded by the [0,1] intveral, Papke and Wooldridge (1996) propose a quasi-maximum
likelihood estimator (QMLE) of β based on the Bernoulli log-likelihood function which is defined
as
li(β) ≡ Di log[Λ(Xiβ)] + (1−Di)[1− Λ(Xiβ)]. (2)
Equipped with consistent estimates for β from maximizing the sum of li(β) over all observations,
the estimated generalized propensity score, R̂i, can be expressed as
Rˆi = [Λ(Xiβ̂)].
3 (3)
3This expression for R̂i follows Guardabascio and Ventura (2014) who show that, whenever a Bernoulli QMLE
is applied, the conditional density corresponds to the generalized propensity score. For all other cases, R̂i is given
by the likelihood function evaluated at β̂. Fryges and Wagner (2008), in contrast, apply the latter approach to
the Bernoulli QMLE resulting in Rˆi = [Λ(Xiβ̂)]
Di [1− Λ(Xiβ̂)](1−Di).
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The second step involves to estimate the conditional expectation of ∆Yi (e.g., post-M&A employ-
ment growth) given the treatment variable Di and the estimated propensity score R̂i. Following
Hirano and Imbens (2004), we chose a quadratic approximation for the conditional expectation
of ∆Yi, given by
E[∆Yi|Di, R̂i] = α0 + α1Di + α2D2i + α3R̂i + α4R̂2i + α5DiR̂i. (4)
Equation (4) is estimated by OLS. The third step comprises to calculate the average treatment
effect for any intensity interval d (in our case 10 percent traded ownership), making use of the
obtained parameter estimates from the second step
Eˆ[∆Y (d)] =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(α̂0 + α̂1d+ α̂2d
2 + α̂3r̂(d,Xi) + α̂4r̂(d,Xi)
2 + α̂5dr̂(d,Xi). (5)
Standard errors for the conditional expectations are calculated via bootstrapping methods. In
the empirical exercise discussed below, we report 95 percent confidence intervals based on 500
bootstrap replications.
3 Empirical application: Employment effects of M&As
3.1 Data description and descriptives
Our sample combines information on European M&As (collected in Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr
database) with firm-level balance sheet information and profit and loss accounts (taken from
the Amadeus database) between 2003 and 2010.4 When constructing the M&A data we impose
some exclusion and aggregation restrictions: First, we exclude all firms that have been targets
of multiple acquisitions by different acquiring firms. For such firms it would be difficult to assess
the the separate employment effect of each takeover (see Oberhofer 2013). Second, in case the
acquiring firm bought smaller shares of the target firm within one year and by multiple trans-
actions, we aggregate the individual transactions to one overall acquired ownership share. This
should reflect the true extend of intended ownership control by the acquiring firm. The result-
ing sample at hand contains 1,350 M&As, of which 999 cases represent 100 percent takeovers.
4Similar data have been applied among others, in the applications of Stiebale and Trax (2011) and Oberhofer
(2013).
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The distribution of minority-transactions can be further decomposed into the following groups
of acquired shares: In 54 transactions, less than 10 percent of ownership are acquired, 16 (29)
deals involve between 10 (15) and 14.9 (24.9) of available shares, while in 56 cases at least a
blocking minority of 25 percent but less than an absolute majority of shares (50 percent) are
acquired. In contrast to Oberhofer (2013), this application considers a more recent time period
with a better coverage of European M&A transactions in the Zephyr database. This, together
with the additional inclusion of minority acquisitions, explains the difference in the number of
observed M&A cases.
Applying the GPSM, we employ an additional control group drawn from a random sample,
containing 25 percent of all non-acquired firms in the Amadeus database with non-missing data
(i.e., 161,389 firms). The outcome variable is defined as the average post-M&A employment
growth rate over a two year time window. The choice of observable characteristics collected in
X is mainly based on the selection equation reported in Oberhofer (2013). Furthermore, we
include two additional variables that capture alternative dimensions of the ownership structure
relevant for corporate governance issues.5 Among these are an indicator variable of whether
a firm is publicly quoted and the number of shareholders of each respective firm. We further
also include the number of subsidiaries controlled by the potential M&A targets. The overall
corporate network indirectly included in a transaction is also likely to affect the desired share
of ownership that might be involved in a transaction.
In the empirical exercise, we concentrate on five different samples including (a) all M&As,
(b) only domestic M&As, (c) only cross-border M&As and (d) only firms located in EU-15
economies or (e) in non-EU-15 countries. The latter group of countries includes Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland and Ukraine. The selection of these five different samples is
based on findings in the previous literature which highlight differing economic effects induced
by domestic and foreign M&As (see, e.g., Bandick and Go¨rg 2010, Stiebale and Trax 2011) and
5We are grateful to one of the referees for pointing us to this issue.
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across groups of countries (see, e.g., Oberhofer, Sto¨ckl, Winner 2012).
Table 1 provides some summary statistics on our dataset. The first column in Table 1 reveals
that the acquired ownership share in our sample is relatively large. This is mainly driven by
the relative large number of 100% acquisitions. The minimum value, however, indicates that
also very small shares are traded. Focusing on the outcome of interest, the average employment
growth rate over a two-year post-acquisition window amounts to 1.5 percent across all acquired
firms (see the top of Table 1). In the random control group reported at the bottom of the table,
average employment growth is one percentage point lower. Furthermore, acquisition targets are,
on average, more profitable (measured in terms of returns on assets), four times larger, six and
a half years older, more capital intense (total assets per employee) and more productive (value
added per employee).
A comparison of minority and majority acquired targets also reveals some interesting differ-
ences. Minority M&A targets (with a maximum of 50 percent ownership acquisition) grow
faster, are almost ten times larger, ten years older, more capital intense, more productive but
less profitable then majority acquired targets. Most strikingly, 42 percent of all minority M&A
targets are publicly quoted and these firms control a large number of subsidiaries (i.e, 23.8 on
average) and are themselves controlled by an average of 16.5 shareholders.
These substantial differences across minority and majority acquisition target support the in-
clusion of a large control group containing of non-acquired firms. Any propensity score based
approach crucially relies on the balancing property assumptions which states that firms with
alike propensity scores are also not systematically different in their observable characteristics.
Focusing on the minimum and maximum values reported for the M&A targets and the non-
acquired control firms one observes a reasonable overlap in the realisations of all covariates of
interest. This should allow to find proper control firms for the GPSM approach to work well.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for M&A transactions and the random control
group
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
M&A targets (Full sample )
Employment growth 1, 039 0.016 0.126 -0.601 0.770
Ownership shares 1, 350 0.870 0.269 0.010 1
Employees 1, 350 529.323 2,425.608 1 42,375
Firm age 1, 350 29.850 24.680 3 204
Capital intensity 1, 350 437.928 5,062.970 3.723 170,615
Return on assets 1, 350 0.121 0.102 0.001 0.699
Labor productivity 1, 350 101.427 592.559 1.272 18,068
Publicly quoted 1, 350 0.071 0.257 0 1
Shareholders 1, 350 3.524 10.610 0 126
Subsidiaries 1, 350 4.801 23.729 0 496
M&A targets (Minority M&As only)
Employment growth 126 0.035 0.144 -0.435 0.518
Ownership shares 166 0.223 0.163 0.010 0.5
Employees 166 2,237.964 6,412.054 1 42,375
Firm age 166 38.801 34.290 3 204
Capital intensity 166 912.619 5,652.798 3.723 59,551
Return on assets 166 0.080 0.059 0.002 0.362
Labor productivity 166 172.006 924.126 2.084 10,410
Publicly quoted 166 0.422 0.495 0 1
Shareholders 166 16.572 26.224 0 126
Subsidiaries 166 23.789 62.875 0 496
M&A targets (Majority M&As only)
Employment growth 913 0.013 0.123 -0.601 0.770
Ownership shares 1, 184 0.960 0.108 0.5003 1
Employees 1, 184 289.767 712.457 1 10,828
Firm age 1, 184 28.595 22.754 4 189
Capital intensity 1, 184 371.375 4,973.704 5.028 170,615
Return on assets 1, 184 0.126 0.106 0.001 0.699
Labor productivity 1, 184 91.531 529.610 1.272 18,068
Publicly quoted 1, 184 0.022 0.147 0 1
Shareholders 1, 184 1.694 2.284 0 48
Subsidiaries 1, 184 2.139 5.743 0 85
Control firms
Employment growth 92, 479 0.006 0.157 -0.996 1.151
Ownership shares 161, 389 0 0 0 0
Employees 161, 389 140.127 1,329.914 1 103,569
Firm age 161, 389 23.145 17.040 1 302
Capital intensity 161, 389 294.554 3,559.554 0.123 578,820
Return on assets 161, 389 0.096 0.105 0 15.052
Labor productivity 161, 389 65.642 503.290 0.160 91,646
Publicly quoted 161, 389 0.009 0.097 0 1
Shareholders 161, 389 2.597 9.737 0 1,380
Subsidiaries 161, 389 1.162 11.463 0 1,219
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3.2 Estimation results
Table 2 summarizes our empirical results regarding step 1 from above for all five different sam-
ples considered. We find that the extent of acquired ownership shares is higher for larger targets
(in terms of employment) and ones that are older (with the exception of M&As in non-EU-15
economies), less capital intense, more productive and more profitable. In non-EU-15 countries,
however, less profitable targets are acquired more intense. This might reflect differences in the
M&A motives across EU-15 and non-EU-15 economies. The interaction term between age and
size is (significantly) negative, suggesting that the extent of traded ownership shares is reduced
for larger and older takeover targets. Conditional on all other covariates the acquired owner-
ship shares are larger for publicly quoted firms and decrease with the number of controlling
shareholder and controlled subsidiaries. For purely domestic M&As, where both involved firms
are located in the same country, the latter effect turns out to be statistically insignificant. In
other words, in domestic M&As the number of controlled firms by the acquired firm seem to be
irrelevant for the relative amount of shares involved in the transactions. However, in general the
estimated effects for public quotation and the numbers of shareholders suggest that corporate
governance indicators are important determinates for the extend of acquired ownership shares
in M&A transactions.
Furthermore, due to the inclusion of a large control group it seems that general equilibrium
effects of M&As are less of importance, which in turn is an important assumption underlying
most treatment estimation approaches (see, e.g., Heckman, Lochner and Taber 1998).6 More-
over, the (Pseudo-)R2 measures are around 10 percent, suggesting that the included covariates
are suitable to explain some variation in our treatment intensity, which in turn indicates that
GPSM works well. This is also confirmed by a series of balancing property tests based on Hi-
rano and Imbens (2004).7 Accordingly, the inclusion of a control group containing non-acquired
firms allows to identify appropriate matches for the evaluation of the M&A induced employment
effects and any value of acquired ownership shares.
6General equilibrium effects of M&As might be present when the merging firms (representing the treatment
group) affect the market situation of their non-merging competitors (the control group). So far, this issue has
not been addressed in the empirical M&A literature.
7These are not reported in the Table but available from the authors upon request.
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Table 2: Estimation of traded ownership shares (QMLE)
Variable Full Sample Domestic Cross-Border EU-15 Non-EU-15
M&As M&As
Firm size (employees) 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Firm age 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗ 0.0014∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0017
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0017)
Firm age × firm size −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0001 −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0005∗∗∗ −0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Capital intensity −0.0021∗∗∗ −0.0012∗∗∗ −0.0009∗∗∗ −0.0022∗∗∗ −0.0016∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Return on assets 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0003∗ 0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ −0.0011∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Labor productivity 0.0062∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0012)
Publicly quoted 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0041∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0017)
Shareholders −0.0008∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0005∗∗∗ −0.0009∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Subsidiaries −0.0001∗∗ 0.0000 −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗ 0.0001∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Time effects: χ2[6] 123.411∗∗∗ 61.027∗∗∗ 76.045∗∗∗ 109.416∗∗∗ 21.610∗∗∗
Industry effects: χ2[2] 2.890 1.961 11.922∗∗∗ 2.134 5.056∗
McFadden-R2 0.1040 0.0823 0.1095 0.1000 0.1493
Observations 162,739 161,976 162,152 133,565 29,174
Notes: Marginal effects reported. Robust Standard errors in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ Significant at
10-, 5- and 1- percent level.
Figure 1 displays the estimated (average) employment effects of M&As and the correspond-
ing 95 percent confidence intervals. Panel (a) focuses on the full sample contaning all M&As,
whereas Panels (b) to (e) report the results for the above mentioned sub-samples containing
either only domestic or cross-border M&As or for separated country groups containing either
EU-15 economies or all other countries.
The figures in all panels indicate some heterogeneity with regard to employment effects of
M&As over the whole distribution of M&A intensities. Panels (a) to (d) report rather similar
effects while there seem to be no statistically significant employment effects within the group
of non-EU-15 countries. The full sample based estimates reported in Panel (a) show a slightly
statistically significant negative employment effect for very small amounts of acquired shares.
The employment effect increases with the extend of acquired ownership and becomes signifi-
cantly positive when trespassing the 25 percent cut-off value. This effect remains positive for
all other acquired shares above this value. In quantitative terms, however, the effect is halved
for transactions above 90 percent of all outstanding shares. However, given the relatively small
number of included M&A cases we are not able to estimate the effects very precisely as indicated
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by the displayed 95 percent confidence intervals.
It might be interesting to contrast these results with the ones of standard PSM methods using
pre-defined ownership shares as treatment variable. Here, we estimate two alternatives: In the
first (second) one, the treatment indicator takes on a value of one only for majority (minority)
acquisitions above (below or equal) 50 percent of all shares. In both cases, the propensity score
is based on the same covariates as in our GPS methodology and the other M&A transactions
(either minority or majority) are excluded. We estimate positive and significant employment
effects under both alternatives, which also confirms the findings reported in Oberhofer (2013)
for similar data. The average employment effect if minority M&As amounts to 3.84 percent
thus exceeding the one for majority takeovers (i.e, 2.24 percent). The reason for this becomes
obvious form Panel (a) in Figure 1. The positive employment effect is lowest for 100 percent
takeovers. Furthermore, full acquisitions constitute the vast majority of all cases. The PSM
based estimate is given by a weighted average of all treatment effects which is dominated by
the 100 percent M&As when focussing on majority takeovers only.
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(a)
(b) (c)
(d) (e)
Figure 1: Estimated employment effects of M&As for samples containing (a) all M&As, (b) only
domestic M&As, (c) only cross-border M&As, (d) firms in EU-15 economies M&As and (e) in
Non-EU-15 economies. Confidence intervals are based on 500 bootstrap replications.
Panels (b) and (c) indicate that for cross-border M&As the positive employment effect is slightly
more pronounced and statistically more significant than for purely domestic ones. For domestic
M&As, employment only significantly increase above the 70 percent threshold of acquired own-
ership. For cross-border M&As, we identify significant and positive employment effects already
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above the 25 percent cut-off in acquired ownership shares. This, however, indicates that the
commonly applied 10 percent ownership criteria for identifying FDI might be too low in order
capture strategic control in newly acquired foreign firms. Finally, for M&As carried out within
the EU-15 economies, we estimate significant and positive employment effects already above the
10 percent level of acquired shares. Overall, our findings clearly show that the empirical results
regarding employments effects of M&As are not entirely insensitive to the choice of ownership
cut-off values. The quantitative magnitude and its statistical significance vary considerable over
the whole range of possible M&A intensities.
4 Conclusion
This note proposes the application of a continuous treatment approach to analyze the economic
effects of M&As. Rather than reducing variation in the treatment variable via the choice of
more or less arbitrary cutoff-values in traded ownership shares, this framework allows to evalu-
ate the impact of M&As over the whole distribution of treatment intensities. Furthermore, such
an approach allows to more explicitly acknowledge the literature on the economics of corporate
governance which identifies crucial constraints for the strategic decision making within firms.
Using a sample of European M&As and relying on the example of post-M&A employment ef-
fects, we observe that the impact of M&As varies over the traded ownership distribution, but,
in qualitative terms, we are able to confirm findings provided by previous research applying
binary treatment indicators.
However, the GPSM approach would allow future research to analyze economic effects of M&As
in a more fine-grained way. Potential fruitful avenues for further research in this regard include:
A cross-country comparison of M&A induced economic effects in order to identify how different
corporate governance regulations shape the relationship between ownership and M&A effects.
This would also allow a more explicit analysis of the economic effects of minority acquisitions.
With regard to the latter, more detailed information on the different types of owners would
be necessary to strengthen our understanding on how (minority) ownership translates into eco-
nomic outcomes. The enhanced efforts in collecting all ownership transaction in the integrated
ORBIS database (also provided by Bureau van Dijk), for example, is likely to increase the
13
availability of such data in the future. Moreover, our findings on domestic M&As reported
in Figure 1(b) indicate that positive employment effects are more likely in the absence of any
shareholder being in the possession of a blocking minority. This finding might have interesting
implications for economic policy making and could be further investigated. In line with this,
and as indicated by our preliminary results, the continuous treatment approach also allows to
compare the effects of domestic and cross-border M&As in more detail. At least, our suggestion
for applied work in M&A evaluation would be to provide comprehensive sensitivity analysis at
different cutoff-values in traded ownership shares and for different sub-samples of acquired firms.
The recent contribution of Guardabascio and Ventura (2014) makes GPSM methodes more
easily applicable in standard econometric software. This, together with an increasing availability
of M&A data that are coupled with ownership structure information, could foster a broader
discussion on corporate governance issues for M&A evaluation in the future.
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